Paving The Streets In Gold: A Comparative Analysis Of The 2012 Florida Gaming Bill by Friedman, Todd
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
7-1-2012
Paving The Streets In Gold: A Comparative
Analysis Of The 2012 Florida Gaming Bill
Todd Friedman
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review
by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Todd Friedman, Paving The Streets In Gold: A Comparative Analysis Of The 2012 Florida Gaming Bill , 66 U. Miami L. Rev. 1183 (2014)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol66/iss4/13
Paving the Streets in Gold: A Comparative
Analysis of the 2012 Florida Gaming Bill
TODD FRIEDMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION: RESORT-CASINOS IN FLORIDA ............................ 1183
II. THESIS: SUGGESTED REFORMS TO FLORIDA'S 2012 GAMING BILL ............ 1186
III. AN EXAMINATION OF ESTABLISHED REGULATORY SCHEMES: NEVADA AND NEW
JERSEY.............................................................. 1187
a. N evada ......................................................... 1188
i. CLEARLY DEFINED REGULATORY ROLE FOR STATE OFFICIALS ........ . 1.I189
ii. DELEGATION OF POWER TO LOCAL OFFICIALS .......................... 1190
b. N ew Jersey ..................................................... 1192
i. CENTRALIZED REGULATORY MODEL ................................... 1193
ii. PUBLIC POLICY & TAX REVENUES ............................... 1195
IV. FLORIDA'S GAMING BILL: AN ANALYSIS ....................................... 1196
a. Navigating the Casino-Resort Legislative Impasse ..................... .1197
b. Amended Senate Bill 710: An Overview ............................. 1200
c. The Destination Resort Act ........................................... 1202
d. Centralization of Power under the Destination Resort Act .............. 1204
e. Need for Delegating More Power to Local Government Bodies .......... 1205
f. Developing a Sound Policy Goal ................................... 1207
V. CONCLUSION: AN HISTORICAL OBSERVATION ............................. 1208
1. INTRODUCTION: RESORT-CASINOS IN FLORIDA
An epic battle mounting opposing forces will decide the fate of
gambling in Florida.' On the pro-gaming side, the Malaysian conglom-
erate known as the Genting Group,2 Las Vegas casino magnates,' mem-
bers of the established pari-mutuel industry,' and the Miami Chamber of
* B.A. 2009, Swarthmore College; J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Miami School of
Law. Thank you to Professor Robert M. Jarvis for your invaluable insight and feedback, Tal
Lifshitz, Ana Romes, and Emily Horowitz for your time and guidance, and special thanks to
Lindsey Lazopoulos, A0.
1. Mary Ellen Klas, Resort casino debate could become epic battle, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 7,
2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/07/2578585/resort-casino-debate-could-
become.html; Andres Viglucci & Charles Rabin, Vegas company looking to build Miami
gambling resort, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/10/03/243732
0/vegas-company-looking-to-build.html.
2. Genting is pronounced with a hard 'g' sound, like 'gambling' or 'gallup,' as opposed to
the soft 'g' sound in words like 'general' or 'generate.'
3. Douglas Hanks, Two Vegas magnates disagree on Miami's casino potential, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 28, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/10/28/2477160/two-
vegas-magnates-disagree-on.html.
4. See DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/pmw/
index.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2012). Mary Ellen Klas, Resort casino debate could become epic
battle, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 7, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/07/
2578585/resort-casino-debate-could-become.html.
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Commerce' hired a team of lobbyists seeking to bring Las Vegas-style
gaming to Florida. In opposition to the gaming coalition, representatives
of the Florida Seminole Tribe and Disney World teamed up with relig-
ious groups,6 prominent local and state politicians,' and small business
owners' to defeat the bill. In fact, five months before the commencement
of the 2012 Florida legislative session commenced, Florida gaming
insiders estimated that these parties had spent over $2 million on lobby-
ing fees.9
In October 2011, Florida State Senator Ellyn Bogdanoff' 0 and State
Representative Erik Fresen" filed identical bills proposing a maximum
of three mega-casino licenses in Florida.12 The bill aimed to gain popu-
lar support by capping the number of first-class, resort-casinos at three,
gradually squeezing out the competition, and by achieving a "net reduc-
tion" in Florida gaming."
Shepard Broad Law Center Professor and South Florida's leading
academic voice on gaming-related issues, Robert M. Jarvis, opined that
the pro-gaming coalition mistakenly underestimated the strength of the
opposition movement.14 Anti-casino lobbyists forced Senator Bogdanoff
to cripple her bill with an amendment that would enable pari-mutuels'
5. Douglas Hanks, Miami Chamber of Commerce endorses casinos, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
4, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.conm/2012/01/04/2573298/miami-chamber-of-
commerce-endorses.html.
6. Michael Vasquez, Seminoles expand casino operations, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 5, 2011,
available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/10/04/2440619/seminoles-expand-casino-opera
tions.html; Mary Ellen Klas, Resort casino debate could become epic battle, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
7, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/07/2578585/resort-casino-debate-
could-become.html.
7. Mary Ellen Klas, Opponents line up against new casino bill, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28,
2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/10/28/2477242/opponents-line-up-against-
new.html
8. Elaine Walker, Would casino mega resort hurt existing Miami restaurants and shops?
Opinion is split, THE MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/
2012/01/19/2612257_p2/would-casino-mega-resort-hurt.html.
9. Mary Ellen Klas, Legislators are counting on rare moment to bring resort casinos to
Florida, MIAMI HERALD, Sep. 10, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/09/10/
2400167/legislators-are-counting-on-rare.html.
10. Republican-Fort Lauderdale.
I1. Republican-Miami.
12. Mary Ellen Klas, Casino bill would help mega resorts, hurts racetracks, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 26, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/10/26/2472429/casino-
bill-sacrifices-horse-and.html.
13. Mary Ellen Klas, Legislators are counting on rare moment to bring resort casinos to
Florida, MIAMI HERALD, Sep. 10, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/20l1/09/10/
2400167/legislators-are-counting-on-rare.html.
14. Telephone Interview with Robert M. Jarvis, Professor, Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad Law Center, January 31, 2012; Email from Robert M. Jarvis, Professor, Nova
Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, March 14, 2012.
15. Pari-mutuels, also known as "racinos," refer to a particular type of betting based upon the
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to compete with the casino-resorts by installing Las Vegas-style casino
slots. 16 Senator Bogdanoff admitted that the amendment would expand
gaming in Florida contrary to her express policy goal." Shortly after the
amendment, Representative Fresen removed the gaming bill from the
floor, effectively killing it.'8
Despite an early defeat in 2012, gaming fever has spread through
the veins, and pockets, of Florida and its citizens. In May 2011, for
example, the Genting Group acquired the Miami Herald's iconic, 14-
acre, waterfront downtown headquarters for $236 million.' 9 Since then,
Genting has purchased about sixteen additional acres of property adja-
cent to the Herald building for an estimated $206 million.2 0 Meanwhile,
the owner of Caesar's Palace was rumored to be in negotiations to buy a
racetrack in Hallandale Beach,21 and Las Vegas Sands executives 22
awaited the nod from owner Sheldon Adelson to purchase the Miami
World Center.23 Elsewhere, residents of two northern Florida counties
voted in favor of installing slot machines at pari-mutuels, and another
senate bill would hold referendums in three central Florida counties to
authorize slot machine gaming.24
collective odds of all bettors. Florida permits pari-mutuel horse racing, harness horse racing,
greyhound racing, jai alai games, and cardroom poker games.
16. In effect, if a majority of a county votes in favor of permitting gaming, then any licensed
pari-mutuel situated inside that voting county may introduce additional slot machines and other
gaming devices. See Mary Ellen Klas, Pari-mutuels gain parity in gambling bill, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 10, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/09/2581343/senate-committee-
approves-pari.html; see also S.B. 710cl, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012) (proposing section
551.304(1)(f), Florida Statutes); S.B. 710c1, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012) (proposing section
551.307, Florida Statutes).
17. Mary Ellen Klas, Pari-mutuels gain parity in gambling bill, THE MIAMI HERALD,
Sep. 1, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/09/2581343/senate-committee-
approves-pari.html.
18. Casino bill all but dies as Fresen asks for postponed vote, MIAMI HERALD BLOG (Feb. 3,
2012, 3:23 PM), available at http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2012/02/casino-bill-
all-but-dies-as-fresen-asks-for-postponed-vote.html.
19. Elaine Walker, Owner of Herald property buys more land, MIAMI HERALD, Sep. 1,
2011, available at http://www.miamiheratd.com/2011/09/01/2386165/owner-of-herald-property-
buys.html.
20. Elaine Walker, Buying distressed real estate debt remains growth area, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 31, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/10/30/2479542/buying-distressed-
real-estate.html.
21. Mary Ellen Klas, Legislators are counting on rare moment to bring resort casinos to
Florida, MIAMI HERALD, Sep. 10, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/09/10/
2400167/legislators-are-counting-on-rare.html.
22. Las Vegas Sands is perhaps most famously known for owning The Venetian in Las
Vegas.
23. Douglas Hanks, Sands CEO backs Gingrinch and a Miami Casino, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 31, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/27/2612070/sands-ceo-backs-
gingrich-and-a.html.
24. Mary Ellen Klas, Voters approve slot machines in two rural counties, but legal battle
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Given the escalating interest in Florida gaming, the question is not,
"Will the legislature legalize resort-casino gaming in Florida?" Rather,
the more appropriate question is, "When will resort-casino gaming come
to Florida?" In most states with resort-casinos, like Ohio, Pennsylvania,
or New Jersey, it took years and multiple trips to the polls before voters
approved gaming.2 5 For example, citizens voted against casino gaming
in New Jersey three times before they amended the state constitution in
1976.26 Consequently, it is merely a matter of time before resort-casinos
break ground on Floridian turf.
II. THESIS: SUGGESTED REFORMS To FLORIDA'S GAMING BILL
This article analyzes the 2012 Florida gaming bill by cross-refer-
encing key components of the bill with the Nevadan and New Jersey
counterparts. The Nevada model distributes regulatory power among
state and local government bodies. In contrast, the New Jersey model
consolidates regulatory power in the hands of state government officials.
Beginning with the Nevada regulatory model, I argue that the distribu-
tion of regulatory power between state and local government officials
forces casino-license applicants to heed the demands of local popula-
tions, which facilitates orderly and organic gaming growth and regula-
tion. Next, I review the New Jersey model and identify the undesired
consequences of centralizing regulatory power in the hands of state gov-
ernment officials. I also argue that the policy goal pursued by the legis-
lature-subsidizing various senior citizen living expenses with gaming
tax revenues-would be better achieved by investing gaming tax reve-
nues in public infrastructure to empower the general public to generate
more Social Security revenues.
After examining those models, this article transitions toward the
Florida gaming bill and suggests reforms to better serve the interests of
Florida residents, gaming entrepreneurs, and state and local govern-
ments. I argue two main points: first, the Florida legislature should
require casino-resort license holders to offer a minority partnership
interest to the public (with a preference toward members of Florida's
established gaming industry); and second, the Florida legislature should
delegate even more power to local governmental bodies. These reforms
would achieve a net reduction in Florida gaming, preserve the invest-
looms, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 4, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/31/
2618018/voters-approve-slot-machines-in.html.
25. See, e.g., Suzette Parmley, States go all in to get a shot at gambling gold: Delaware,
Ohio, and others look to challenge Pa. and Atlantic City for a share of a shrinking pot,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 6, 2009, at Al.
26. GEORGE STERNLIEB & JAMES W. HUGHES, THE ATLANTIC CITY GAMBLE, 31 (1st ed.
1983).
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ments made by the established Florida gaming industry, and give pro-
spective casino-resort licensees a desired monopoly over the Florida
gaming market.
III. AN EXAMINATION OF ESTABLISHED REGULATORY SCHEMES:
NEVADA AND NEW JERSEY
The criteria that generally establish competitive advantages, like
climate, land, labor, or skill, do not constrain the gaming industry.27
Without regulation, a savvy management team with a deep pocket would
be able to establish a gaming enterprise virtually anywhere in the world.
Questions relating to regulation are only of degree; regulation is critical
to ensure the orderly development of modern Florida gaming.
Still, bigger-or more extensive regulation-is not always better.
In 2010, the New Jersey gaming regulatory agency, the New Jersey
Casino Control Commission ("NJCCC"), employed approximately
1,110 employees on a $68 million operating expense budget. 28 That
year, New Jersey gaming-related industries generated nearly $3.6 billion
in taxable gaming revenues,29 and the NJCCC collected about $385 mil-
lion in taxes. 30 By comparison, the Nevada Gaming Control Board
employed 443 salaried agents3' on a $32.5 million operating budget.3 2 In
2010, Nevadan gaming-related industries generated $9.7 billion in taxa-
ble revenues33 and the Nevada gaming agency collected $835 million in
taxes." Even though Nevada's gaming industry generates three times
the amount of taxable revenues than New Jersey's industry, Nevada
employs less than half the amount of employees.
Evidently, Florida does not necessarily need burgeoning amounts
of bureaucracy to regulate a newly established gaming industry. Florida
27. Tomer Broude & Doron Teichman, Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The Political
Economy of Globalized Criminal Activity, 62 VAND. L. REv. 795, 818 (2009).
28. NEW JERSEY CASINO CONTROL COMMISSION: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, at 21 (2010),
available at www.state.nj.us/casinos/about/commrepo/.
29. Id. at 29 (showing gaming tax revenues fell nearly $400 million from 2009).
30. Id. at 21.
31. Howard Stutz, Nevada Gaming Control board escapes cuts, CASINO CITY TIMES, Jul. 28,
2009, available at http://www.casinocitytimes.com/article/nevada-gaming-control-board-escapes-
cuts-57253.
32. Howard Stutz, Gaming Control Board cuts won't lead to job losses, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-
JOURNAL, Mar. 9, 2010, available at http://www.lvrj.com/news/gaming-control-board-cuts-wont-
lead-to-job-losses-87142452.html.
33. NEVADA STATE GAMING CONTROL BOARD: 2010 GAMING REVENUE REPORT, at A-1,
available at http://gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdf/1g_10dec.pdf; see also GAMING REVENUE
REPORT: 2011 INDEX, at 48; NEVADA GAMING COMMISSION AND STATE GAMING CONTROL BOARD
QUARTERLY STATISTICS REPORT FOR THE QUARTER ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 2.
34. See NEVADA GAMING COMMISSION AND STATE GAMING CONTROL BOARD QUARTERLY
STATISTICS REPORT FOR THE QUARTER ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 4.
2012] 1187
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
simply needs effective regulation3 5 to facilitate healthy, sustainable
growth and eradicate the undesired elements often associated with gam-
ing, 6 including fraud, pathological addiction, and organized crime.
These goals can be accomplished by including the critical components
of an effective regulatory model: licensing, operational controls,
enforcement, tax, and accounting and audit.38
a. NEVADA
Nevada gaming regulations aim to build public trust and confidence
in the gaming industry.39 Maintaining legitimacy is paramount in
Nevada due in large part to the association of people like Meyer Lansky,
the Genovese crime family, and other mobsters who once called Nevada
home.40 Florida has much to learn from Nevada. Indeed, Meyer Lanksy
once operated a thriving pari-mutuel business in South Florida.4 1
The success of Nevada regulatory model lends itself toward enlist-
ing local governmental effort in legitimizing gaming entrepreneurs.
Nevada state officials focus their attention on licensing standards, com-
pliance issues, conducting thorough audit-and-accounting, and collecting
tax revenues. Meanwhile, the legislature empowered local governmental
bodies to manage local issues. Nevada regulations force prospective
licensees to build trust with local citizens, which in turn, lead to the
achievement of Nevada's public policy goals. Ultimately, the symbiotic
cohesion between state and local government officials results in effec-
tive regulation.
35. Telephone Interview with Kenneth Goodman, Professor, University of Miami Ethics
Department Chair, Jan. 16, 2012.
36. See, e.g., J. Weaver, Calder Race Course supervisor, 2 contractors charged in alleged
kickback scheme, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 2., 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/02/02/
2621421/calder-race-course-supervisor.html.
37. Jack Goldsmith, What Internet Gambling Legislation Teaches About Internet Regulation,
32 INT'L. LAW. 1115, 1116 (1998); K. Alexa Koenig, Prohibition's Pending Demise: Internet
Gambling & United States Policy, 10 U. Prrr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 3, 3-4 (2009); Noe Hamra
Carbajales, No More Bets: The United states Rolls the Dice One More Time Regarding
International Relations and Foreign Internet Gambling Services, 19 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
397, 401, 415 (2010).
38. Cory Aronovitz, The Regulation of Commercial Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 181, 189
(2002).
39. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0129(1)(b), (c) (2011); see also EDWARD A MORSE & ERNEST
P. Goss, GOVERNING FORTUNE: CASINO GAMBLING IN AMERICA, 100 (1st ed. 2007).
40. EDWARD A MORSE & ERNEST P. Goss, GOVERNING FORTUNE: CASINO GAMBLING IN
AMERICA, 100 (1st ed. 2007).
41. See, e.g., Fred Grimm, Where's Meyer Lansky when you need him?, MIAMI HERALD, NOV.
28, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/11/28/2522527/wheres-meyer-lansky-
when-you-need.html.
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1. CLEARLY DEFINED REGULATORY ROLE FOR STATE OFFICIALS
Nevada regulates gaming through two overlapping agencies: the
Nevada Gaming Commission4 2 ("Gaming Commission") and the State
Gaming Control Board ("Control Board").43 The Gaming Commission
wields the most significant power, executing the final word over licens-
ing and regulatory policy decisions.' It consists of five members,4 5
appointed by the governor4 6 on a part-time basis.4 7 The Control Board
consists of three full-time members,4 8 also appointed by the governor.4 9
Together, the Gaming Commission and Control Board are responsible
for compiling all information and data on licensees and applicants relat-
ing to finances, earnings, revenues, criminal record, background, gov-
ernment records, audits, investigations, and public hearings.5 o The
Gaming Commission and Control Board have the authority to inspect,
and even seize or impound, any gaming premise in its entirety, gaming
equipment, documents and any other record for examination.
If the Gaming Commission is the brain of the operation, then the
Control Board is the muscle. Six divisions carry out the duties of the
Control Board. The Audit Division audits casinos with more than $3
million in revenue to ensure compliance with applicable gaming laws
and proper reporting. The Investigation and Enforcement Divisions
carry out background investigations on prospective licensees and
employees, and investigate and monitor suspected criminal activity and
organized crime. The Tax and License Division is responsible for col-
lecting all taxes imposed on gambling. The Corporate Securities Divi-
sion monitors publicly traded companies and their subsidiaries operating
gaming businesses in Nevada. Last, the Technology Division provides
the laboratory and field-testing for electronic devices and software to
ensure their integrity for gaming patrons.5 2
All of these divisions work together toward assuring the public of
the legitimacy of the industry. For example, the Licensing Division con-
ducts background checks on all applicants to determine whether new-
comers are legitimate businesspeople. The Audit Division accounts for
every dollar of gaming revenues to verify that revenues are generated
42. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.022 (2011).
43. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.030 (2011).
44. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.1405(4) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.145(1) (2011).
45. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.022 (2011).
46. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.024(1) (2011).
47. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.025(1) (2011).
48. NEv. REv. STAT. § 463.030; N.R.S. 463.060(1) (2011).
49. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.050(2) (2011).
50. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.120(4) (2011).
51. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.140(2) (2011).
52. See MORSE & Goss, supra note 40, 100-02.
11892012]
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from gaming, rather than criminal enterprise. In the event that criminal
activity is suspected, the Investigation and Enforcement Division aims to
discover and expose any illicit activity.
2. DELEGATION OF POWER TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES
Nevada gaming regulations aim to sustain the economic lifeline of
the state,54 while garnering the cooperation of local communities hous-
ing gaming facilities. 5 When the Nevada legislature enacted the Nevada
Gaming Control Act, it recognized that the well-being and prosperity of
the State of Nevada as a whole is necessarily dependent on the orderly,
responsible growth of the gaming industry. 6 In 2010, the State of
Nevada Economic Forum estimated that nearly thirty-two percent of
future state revenues would come from gaming-related taxes, constitut-
ing the single largest concentration of revenue.57 This is an increase
from twenty percent in 2004.
Perhaps the ubiquitous presence of gaming in Nevada compelled
the state legislature to confer concurrent authority between the state and
local governments over the licensure and regulation of gaming.5 1 It is
my contention that local elected officials in Nevada are vested with sig-
nificant powers60 because vesting local authorities with power forces
gaming entrepreneurs to heed the concerns and demands of local citi-
zens. If gaming entrepreneurs heed the concerns and demands of local
citizens (through their local governmental bodies), gaming expands with
the support of the local communities.
To be clear, Nevada gaming regulations put towns, cities, and
counties on equal footing with the state government: each governmental
body can require a gaming enterprise to satisfy reasonable requirements
before acquiring a town, city, county, or state license.6 1 Presumably as a
matter of administrative efficiency, the state must approve the licensee
first.6 2 After receiving state approval, a holder of a valid state license
53. Id.
54. See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0129 (2011).
55. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.3072 (2011).
56. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.3072(4)(a) (2011).
57. JOHN RESTREPO, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE ON FUTURE STATE
REVENUES, 12-13, (2010) (combining gaming and live entertainment taxes for the 2011-2013
fiscal years).
58. MORSE & Goss, supra note 40, 102.
59. All concurrent jurisdictions must approve a casino license. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.190(1)
(2011); see generally NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 463.160-463.240 (2011).
60. See, e.g., N.R.S. 463.190(1) (2011) (stating "a person is not permitted to engage in
gaming operations in any city or town in this state, unless the person has in force valid state and
county licenses, as well as any licenses required by the city or town").
61. Id.
62. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.240 (2011) ("No county, city or town may grant a gaming
1190 [Vol. 66:1183
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must comply with the qualifications required by county ordinance to
obtain a county license.63 Once the state and county have given
approval, an applicant must continue down the chain and meet the
requirements imposed by municipal ordinance.6 4 Thus, the Nevada leg-
islature grants significant power to local government bodies to ensure
license holders acknowledge the concerns and meet the demands of local
communities.
Specifically, local governing bodies vote on whether to convert
their locales into "gaming enterprise districts."" A gaming enterprise
district is a county, city, or town that permits gaming facilities to operate
with non-restricted licenses.66 A non-restricted license permits a gaming
facility to operate more than fifteen slot machines and other authorized
games.6 7 Ultimately, Nevada law requires that an individual seeking to
open an establishment with a non-restricted license must petition the
county, city, or town with having jurisdiction over the location of the
proposed establishment to hold a public hearing.6 8 Next, the petitioner
must mail notice of the hearing to all owners and tenants of real property
within 2,500 feet of the property line of the proposed establishment.69 At
the hearing, the petitioner has a burden to prove that the local utilities
are adequate, that the proposed establishment will not unduly impact
public services or the local quality of life, and that the operation will
stabilize and enhance the local economy among other considerations.70
Ultimately, a local license requires three-fourths of the commissioners to
vote in favor of the gaming enterprise district petition."
Despite a tendency to rank near the bottom fifty states in municipal
discretion, Nevada courts also have repeatedly upheld the discretionary
power of municipal and county government officials over gaming-
related issues.7 2 In State ex. Rel. Grimes v. Board, the Nevada Supreme
license to any applicant unless the applicant holds a valid state gaming license . . . the state
gaming license imposes no requirements upon any such county, city, or town to issue a gaming
license to the applicant").
63. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.180(1) (2011); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.230(1) (2011).
64. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.190(1) (2011).
65. See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.3086 (2011).
66. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0158 (2011).
67. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0177 (2011).
68. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.3086(2) (2011).
69. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.3086(3) (2011).
70. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.3086(6) (2011).
71. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.3086(8) (2011).
72. Compare State ex. Rel. Grimes v. Board, I P.2d 570, 572 (Nev. 1931) (allowing greater
discretion in gaming matters); State v. Rosenthal, 559 P.2d 830, 833 (Nev. 1977), with, Louis V.
Csoka, The Dream of Greater Municipal Autonomy: Should The Legislature or the Courts Modify
Dillon's Rule, A Common Law Restraint on Municipal Power?, 29 N. CAR. CENT. L. J. 194, 208
(2007).
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Court held that the power of the Las Vegas board of city commissioners
to regulate gambling, and even prohibit it within city limits, was undeni-
able. Writing for the majority Justice Ducker explained, "The power to
restrict the number of licenses in the city is we think a very necessary
implication from the power to license and regulate gambling."" Nearly
sixty years later, the Nevada Supreme Court reaffirmed the discretion of
local government officials to license, regulate, and prohibit gaming."
To be sure, local governments are not given carte blanche. Local
licensing power is subject to state control.7 6 Most significantly, the Con-
trol Board-as opposed to the local government-investigates the infor-
mation required by a city or county that licenses gaming. Furthermore,
the Act places a ceiling on the amount of fees and taxes county and city
governments may exact from licensees." For example, incorporated cit-
ies with large populations may only levy property taxes equivalent to
twenty percent of licensing fees assessed in that particular incorporated
city.7 9
Nevertheless, Nevada local government officials have significant
regulatory control. Proceeding forward, I will emphasize the absence of
similar regulatory power delegated to Florida and New Jersey municipal
and county officials. Although Florida citizens are given the opportunity
to vote in countywide referendums on whether to allow casino-resorts in
the respective county,so all other significant licensing and regulatory
power remains in the hands of Florida state officials.
b. NEW JERSEY
In 1976, New Jersey voters approved of casino gambling as a
''unique tool of urban redevelopment" to facilitate the revitalization of
Atlantic City and other distressed municipalities throughout the State."'
The Casino Control Act intended to restore the legacy of Atlantic City as
a premiere tourist destination82 and confined the establishment of
73. Grimes, 1 P.2d at 572.
74. Id.
75. Clark Cnty. Liquor & Gaming Licensing Bd. v. Simon & Tucker, Inc., 787 P.2d 782, 783
(Nev. 1990) (holding that "the power to license, regulate, and prohibit gambling is within the
discretion of the municipal agency empowered to govern gambling and such agency has a wide
margin of discretion."); See also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 244.335, 244.345 (1990).
76. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.242(1) (2011).
77. Id.
78. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 463.323, 463.325 (2011); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.395
(2011) ("The license fee or tax imposed by a local government ... must not exceed: the amount
... or . .. the rate . . . which was in effect for that purpose on or before April 27, 1981.")
79. NEV. REv. STAT. § 463.327 (2011); see also NEV. REv. STAT. § 463.325(4) (2011).
80. S.B. 710c1, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012) (proposing section 551.307, Florida Statutes).
81. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:21-173.10(a) (2001).
82. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:21-1 (2011).
1192 [Vol. 66:1183
PAVING THE STREETS IN GOLD
casino-hotels in New Jersey to Atlantic City.83 In 2011, however, the
legislature called the commercial viability of New Jersey casinos into
question.8 4 This section argues that the problems plaguing of New
Jersey's gaming industry is due, in part, to the centralization of regula-
tory power in the hands of state government officials, not the prolifera-
tion of casinos in neighboring states like Pennsylvania, New York, and
Ohio." In addition, I will argue that the public policy goals pursued by
these state officials are also hindering New Jersey's gaming industry.
1. CENTRALIZED REGULATORY MODEL
Gaming is a means to an end in New Jersey. It is a means to raise
the revenues that enable the state government to subsidize the reduction
of property taxes, rentals, and telephone, gas, electric, utility and trans-
portation costs for senior citizens." Presumably, the New Jersey legisla-
ture crafted a regulatory scheme that consolidates power in the hands of
the state government, because the intended beneficiaries are constituents
of the state.8
Much like the Nevada Gaming Commission and Control Board, the
New Jersey Casino Control Commission ("Commission") regulates
casino operations. Five members serve five-year terms" and direct five
Divisions: Administration; Financial Evaluation; Licensing; Compli-
ance; and Legal." The New Jersey legislature requires all casino opera-
tors to obtain an "operation certificate" prior to opening to the public.9 0
To obtain the certificate, a casino operator must jump through several
hoops. For example, the Commission scrutinizes the prospective licen-
see during an indefinite test run period under terms and conditions pre-
scribed unilaterally by the Commission.9' Once approved, the
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1(b)(4), (5) (2011).
84. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1(b)(18) (2011) ("as recognized in the July 2010 Report of the
Governor's Advisory Commission on New Jersey Gaming, Sports, and Entertainment, and as
confirmed in subsequent legislative hearings held throughout the state, legalized casino gaming in
New Jersey presently stands at a crossroads, facing critical challenges that jeopardize its important
role in the State economy.").
85. See, e.g., Suzette Parmley, States go all in to get a shot at gambling gold: Delaware,
Ohio, and others look to challenge Pa. and Atlantic City for a share of a shrinking pot,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 6, 2009, at Al.
86. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 48:2-29.30 (2011); N.J. CONsT. art. IV §7, 12(D) (2011).
87. Telephone Interview with Robert M. Jarvis, Professor, Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad Law Center, Dec. 5, 2011.
88. As of Feb. 6, 2012, there were only three active Commissioners. See also N.J. ADMIN.
CODE 19:40-2.1(a) (2011).
89. N.J. ADMIN. CODE 19:40-2.1(c) (2011).
90. N.J. ADMIN. CODE 19:43-7.1(a) (2011).
91. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE 19:43-7.2(b) ("The evaluation or test period shall commence
on such date and at such time as the Commission shall establish, and shall continue thereafter until
further order of the Constitution.").
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Commission has the authority to revoke, suspend or limit an operation
certificate if the licensee fails to strictly comply with the terms of its
certificate. 92
New Jersey regulations seek to protect individual consumers and
society at large from the harms of gaming." For example, limiting gam-
ing to Atlantic City makes gambling less convenient for New Jersey
residents. Rather, compacting competing casino-hotels in one single
space helps to target visitors and those who are inclined to travel.9 4 In
addition, New Jersey imposes betting and loss limits, requires casino-
hotels to fund educational and rehabilitative programs, and enforces
exclusionary and self-exclusionary lists (individuals may fill out
requests to indefinitely exclude themselves from casinos)."
In contrast to Nevada, the rationale for bestowing local government
with power is absent in New Jersey. The citizens of New Jersey
approved the lawful establishment of casino-hotels only within the juris-
dictional limits of Atlantic City.9 6 Therefore, casino gaming cannot
spread to other locales like in the case of Nevada. As a result, there is
less of a need to vest local governments with extensive regulatory
powers.
However, extensive regulatory power consolidated in the hands of
the state has often damaged the individuals the regulations purport to
protect. Less egregious abuses examples include the authority of the
Commission to engage municipal and county employees for services,
sometimes without reimbursing local governing bodies for costs. 9 7 More
extreme abuses include a 2007 incident when former Governor Jon
Corzine shut down all twelve casino-hotels in Atlantic City when a
political impasse prevented legislators from agreeing on the state
budget.98 Flexing his extensive regulatory muscle, however, gave the
governor more than he bargained for when he brought his opposition to
their knees. The emergency shutdown led to a downturn in casino reve-
nues, taxable revenues, confidence of tourists and investors, and subsi-
dies paid out to senior citizens." In addition, the shutdown created
serious social costs on families dependent upon casino-employees who
92. N.J. ADMIN. CODE 19:43-7.5(b) (2011).
93. Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 819 F.Supp. 1312, 1319 (D. N.J. 1993).
94. MORSE & Goss, supra note 40, 119.
95. Id. at 119-122.
96. See Tose, 819 F.Supp. at 1319; see also N.J. CONsT. art. IV, §7, 2(D).
97. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-145.6 (2011).
98. Kelly Cooper, Comment, The New Jersey Casino Shutdown: The Litigation and Costs to
the Industry and Atlantic City's Poor, 9 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 209, 209-10 (2007) (explaining
that Gov. Corzine suspended all casino operations pursuant to the Disaster Control Act that vested
the governor with emergency power).
99. Id. at 211.
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live paycheck-to-paycheck.'o
2. PUBLIC POLICY & TAX REVENUES
As mentioned above, New Jersey citizens voted in 1976 in favor of
amending the New Jersey Constitution to authorize casino gaming.o' In
order to garner popular support for the amendment, the legislature
restricted the use of gaming revenues to "aiding lofty goals" such as
reducing property taxes, rental, telephone, gas, electric, and municipal
utility charges for eligible senior citizens and the disabled as well as
expanded health services.10 2
Ultimately, a vast amount of casino revenues have been spent on
subsidizing senior citizens' living expenses. Meanwhile, the casino reve-
nues reinvested in the local community have been largely unsuccessful
at providing the local community with the infrastructure to produce taxa-
ble income that could also subsidize senior citizen costs. Unfortunately,
the lofty goals that persuaded New Jersey citizens to legalize gaming
undermine the state's ability to allocate capital to achieve the aspired
goals in a sustainable manner.'0 3
In 1984, for example, the legislature created the Casino Reinvest-
ment Development Authority ("CDRA") to oversee the investment of
casino gambling revenues for development projects in Atlantic City and
promote job creation and business expansion throughout New Jersey.' 0 4
In twenty-six years of operation, the CRDA reinvested $1.5 billion of
$1.8 billion back into Atlantic City.'0 5 In other words, the CRDA rein-
vests approximately 83 percent of its revenues back into the source.
Nevertheless, these reinvestment efforts have not succeeded at building
low-income housing and bridging the gap between low-income neigh-
borhoods and local opportunities. In fact, local governments have frus-
trated efforts to introduce low-income housing and expanding
opportunities to the poor through the proliferation of exclusionary zon-
ing practices. 06 In summation, it would appear that New Jersey casino
100. Id.
101. N.J. CONST. art. IV, §7, 12(D).
102. MORSE & Goss, supra note 40, 118.
103. See generally Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEo L. J. 1985 (2000).
104. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-173.10(b)(2001); see also CASINO REINVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, http://www.njcrda.com/pages/Home.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). According to its
mission statement, the CDRA strives to "encourage business development and permanent job
creation, promote opportunities for business expansion, and commit to facilitating a vibrant
economic investment." CASINO REINVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, http://www.njcrda.
com/pages/Home.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
105. Id.
106. Cashin, supra note 103, 2031-32.
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revenues could be utilized more efficiently by the state.
IV. FLORIDA'S GAMING BILL: AN ANALYSIS
The Florida legislature should create a single regulatory agency to
develop a comprehensive policy and cohesive regulatory scheme."o"
Florida, considered the fourth largest gambling state in the nation,"os has
a state lottery, sweepstakes, cruises to nowhere, Seminole Tribe casinos,
pari-mutuel gaming, and online betting. Mirroring the mixed bag of
Florida gaming enterprises, five different state agencies regulate gaming
and applicable laws, regulations, and tax rates vary depending on the
location and type of gaming enterprise conducted.' 09
The particular ingredients of a regulatory scheme and policy goals
sought affect whether local populations support or reject the gaming
industry."o For example, Nevada modeled its regulatory tools to ensure
the expansion of its gaming industry developed lawfully and with the
support of the public. Meanwhile, New Jersey voted in favor of gaming
after the legislature expressed the intent to use gaming funds to subsi-
dize senior citizen living expenses. Florida legislators seek to affect a net
reduction in gaming ' and want to complement the Florida economy
with gaming, not supplement it." 2 On account of these moving parts, the
legislature ought to develop clearer policy goals. As of January 2012,
Florida voters were split on supporting or opposing gaming." 3 Indeed,
depending on who conducted the poll, responses varied widely.'14
107. Gregg Fields & Paola Isupa-Abbott, Covering all bets, DAILY BUSINESS REVIEw, Feb. 27,
2012, at A8.
108. Mary Ellen Klas, Casino bill would help mega resorts, hurts racetracks, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 26, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/10/26/2472429/casino-bill-
sacrifices-horse-and.html.
109. Gregg Fields & Paola Isupa-Abbott, Covering all bets, DAILY BUSINESS REVIEw, Feb. 27,
2012, at A8.
110. MORSE & Goss, supra note 40, 118.
111. Mary Ellen Klas, Legislators are counting on rare moment to bring resort casinos to
Florida, MIAMI HERALD, Sep. 10, 2011, http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/09/10/2400167/
legislators-are-counting-on-rare.html.
112. In geometry, the difference between a complementary and supplementary angle is vast.
The sum of two complementary angles is 90 degrees, whereas the sum of two supplementary
angles is 180 degrees. Therefore, I use the word 'complementary' to connote a lesser degree of
presence.
113. Mary Ellen Klas, Poll: Let voters-not lawmakers-decide future of casinos in Florida,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 29, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com2012/01/29/2615116/
poll-let-voters-not-lawmakers.html.
114. Compare Mary Ellen Klas, Polls show strong local support for casinos in Miami-Dade,
but statewide reluctance, THE MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 18, 2011, available at http://www.
miamiherald.com/2011/10/18/2459679/polls-show-strong-local-support.html, with Mary Ellen
Klas, Poll: Let voters - not lawmakers - decide future of casinos in Florida, THE MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 29, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/29/2615116/poll-let-voters-not-
lawmakers.html.
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This section examines the defeated Florida gaming bill: amended
Senate Bill 710, entitled, "A bill to be entitled."' 15 I argue that the Flor-
ida legislature should delegate more power to municipal governments to
ensure that local citizens will be amenable to the introduction of casino-
resorts. Before arguing for the delegation of more power to local govern-
mental bodies, I begin with a viable solution to the conflicting economic
interests at stake: require casino-resort license holders to make a good
faith effort at entering into a partnership with Florida gaming
entrepreneurs.
a. Navigating the Resort-Casino Legislative Impasse
The most challenging problem facing the passage of the Florida
gaming bill centers on balancing the conflicting interests of Florida's
diversified gaming industry. Leaving aside religious and moral interest
groups opposed to gaming, opposition to gaming includes powerful and
established members of Florida's gaming and entertainment industries,
such as Disney World, the Florida Seminole Tribe, gaming cruises, and
the twenty-eight pari-mutuel facilities, among others."' Casino-resorts
would compete directly with these parties and create adverse economic
effects. Consequently, the Florida legislature should develop a plan to
alleviate these economic repercussions.
Florida legislators should require casino-resort licensees to offer
these groups the opportunity to enter into a partnership with the casino-
resort licensee as a condition upon acquiring a license. First, casino-
resort licensees will benefit from co-opting the competition. Second,
members of Florida's gaming industry will have a meaningful opportu-
nity to transition into Florida's new age of gaming. Third, the public at
large will benefit from having members of their local community
involved in managing the casino-resorts. Fourth, this arrangement will
achieve the desired net reduction in Florida gaming. Altogether, this
arrangement could benefit members of the public at-large, the Florida
legislature, the established Florida gaming and entertainment industries,
and gaming magnates new to Florida.
Using the Genting Group as an example, the Florida legislature
awarded Genting a casino-resort license, the Florida legislature could
condition the award of a resort-casino license upon whether Genting
offered the purchase of a minority interest in Genting's Florida resort-
115. Given the extensive attention surrounding the bill, leaving the bill untitled as "A bill to be
entitled" is amusingly ironic. S.B. 710, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011); see also S.B. 710c1, 2012
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012).
116. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, STATISTICAL
INFORMATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/
pmw/index.html.
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casino. For example, Genting could enter into negotiations with the
Florida Seminole Tribe, Disney World, pari-mutuel owners, or other
members of Florida's gaming industry for a twenty percent interest in its
$3 billion, downtown Miami casino-resort. Competitive negotiations
among these parties would ensure that the appraised value of the minor-
ity interest is fair and appropriate.
In all likelihood, a loose requirement like "good faith negotiations"
might cause dissatisfied parties to bring contentious litigation. The Flor-
ida legislature could facilitate a finding of good faith by enacting a safe
harbor statute. For example, the purchase of twenty percent minority
interest by a Florida corporation or Indian Tribe could constitute irrefu-
table proof of good faith negotiations by the holder of a casino-resort
license. Therefore, if the Florida Seminole Tribe purchases a ten percent
interest in Genting's casino-resort, and the Havenick family, owners of
the Magic City Casino, purchase a ten percent interest in the same
casino-resort, then Genting satisfies the requirement of good faith nego-
tiations. Meanwhile, even if Genting did not invite Disney to negotiate a
minority interest, Genting still satisfies the good faith requirement if the
sale to the Seminole Tribe and Havenick family was for value.
This arrangement creates the net reduction in gaming sought by
Senator Bogdanoff and Representative Fresen.'" 7 Pari-mutuel owners,
for example, could protect their interests by transferring their invest-
ments into Florida's new stage of gaming. These owners could secure
the financing necessary to acquire an interest in a casino-resort by offer-
ing the pari-mutuel's equipment, inventory, and accounts receivable as
collateral. Rather than competing with the casino-resorts, pari-mutuel
owners can maximize their investment by relinquishing control of the
pari-mutuel market in exchange for entry into the casino-resort market.
Pari-mutuel owners located closest to the three casino-resorts would be
most inclined to enter into these partnerships. Moreover, if Florida cor-
porations generate a portion of gaming revenues, then there is a greater
likelihood that a larger portion of gaming revenues will remain in
Florida.
With respect to license holders, the perceived short end of the bar-
gain is illusory. License holders would effectively co-opt their competi-
tion if they were required to enter into partnerships with members of
Florida's current gaming establishment. Over time, license holders
would make up perceived losses because they would be able to eliminate
their competition. In the event that pari-mutuels are unwilling to negoti-
117. Mary Ellen Klas, Pari-mutuels gain parity in gambling bill, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
10, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/09/2581343/senate-committee-
approves-pari.html.
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ate with license holders, gaming magnates might be willing to enter into
limited partnerships with competitors.
Most importantly, this proposal would best serve the interests of the
public at large. By enlisting Florida residents as partners in this new age
of gaming, casino-resorts will be directed and managed by people who
can be held accountable as members of the local community.
Ultimately, the first step toward shaping the future of Florida gam-
ing requires Florida legislators to take control of gaming expansion.
Representative Fresen and Senator Bogdanoff must come to terms with
legislators, like Senator Sachs, to cease all ongoing, collateral expan-
sions of Florida gaming. Most importantly, legislators must come
together to develop a comprehensive vision for the future of Florida
gaming, whether continuing with the status quo or adopting a new
platform.
It is critical that the Florida legislature resolve contentious conflict-
ing interests between anti- and pro-gaming groups to promulgate the
gaming bill into law. As the 2012 legislative session proved, the lobby-
ing power of Disney, Seminole Tribe, and other anti-gaming interest
groups was highly effective at defeating the bill's passage."' Even
though Representative Fresen drafted a bill that would lead to a net
reduction of gaming in Florida," 9 pari-mutuel lobbyists forced Senator
Bogdanoff to amend the gaming bill with provisions that would in fact
expand gaming.12 0 The amendments would authorize pari-mutuels to
host full-scale casino games on their premises, and in effect, operate
businesses that could compete, and survive, with newly introduced
resort-casinos.
Florida gaming expanded despite the efforts of Senator Bogdanoff
and Representative Fresen in Tallahassee. For example, Florida's First
District Court of Appeal held in October 2011 that any entrepreneur who
met certain requirements could open new pari-mutuel facilities in
Miami-Dade and Broward Counties; established pari-mutuel owners had
wanted the First District to hold that only established pari-mutuels could
118. See Jarvis supra, note 14.
119. Mary Ellen Klas, Pari-mutuels gain parity in gambling bill, THE MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 10, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/09/2581343/senate-committee-
approves-pari.html.
120. Specifically, the proposed legislation states that any licensed pari-mutuel as of July 1,
2012 may operate slot machines and other games if, by a majority, the county votes in favor of
permitting casino-resort gaming. See S.B. 710cl, at 49, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012)(enacting
section 551.304(l)(f), Florida Statutes); S.B. 710c1, at 59-60, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2012)(enacting section 551.307, Florida Statutes); see also Mary Ellen Klas, Pari-mutuels gain
parity in gambling bill, THE MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 10, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.
com/2012/01/09/2581343/senate-committee-approves-pari.html.
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expand gaming operations.121  The residents of two northern Florida
counties also voted in favor of authorizing slot machines at established
pari-mutuels.12 2 Another senate bill proposed by Boca Raton Senator
Maria Sachs would have voters in three additional Florida counties
decide whether to permit slot machines at pari-mutuel facilities.123 Ulti-
mately, leadership must maintain vision and direction for any real
change to the future of gaming in Florida.
b. Amended Senate Bill 710: An Overview
Amended Senate Bill 710, the Florida gaming bill, establishes the
Florida Department of Gaming Control (the "Department") to orches-
trate a comprehensive regulatory scheme.124 The Department is com-
posed of three divisions: Enforcement; Licensure; and Revenue and
Audits.125 The Department is vested with broad jurisdiction over all
gaming-related issues.126 For example, the bill strips the Department of
Business and Professional Regulation of jurisdiction over pari-
mutuelsl 27 and assigns that regulatory power to the Department.128
The State Gaming Commission 29 (the "Commission"), comprised
of seven Florida residents serving four-year terms' directs the Depart-
121. Article X, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution authorized slot machine gaming in
Miami-Dade and Broward Counties if approved by countywide referendum, which occurred in
Miami-Dade and Broward in 2008 and 2005, respectively. In 2009, the legislature amended the
definition of facilities eligible to conduct gaming in the original statute. Consequently, the First
District held that any establishment-including newly founded pari-mutuel facilities-that met
the amended definition of an "eligible facility" could open gaming operations in Miami-Dade and
Broward. See generally Fla. Gaming Ctrs., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Reg., 71 So.3d 226
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); see also FLA. CONST., art. X, §23 (2004); Fla. Stat. § 551.102(4)
(2005); Ch. 09-170, §19, Laws of Fla.
122. Mary Ellen Klas, Voters approve slot machines in two rural counties, but legal battle
looms, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 4, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com20l2/01/31/
2618018/voters-approve-slot-machines-in.html.
123. Id.
124. S.B. 710cl, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012)(proposing section 20.318, Florida Statutes).
125. Id. (proposing section 20.318(2), Florida Statutes).
126. Id. (proposing section 20.318(k)(4) which grants the Department the "sole authority and
power to make, adopt, amend, or repeal rules relating to gaming operations, to enforce and to
carry out the provisions of chapters 550 and 551and to regulate authorized gaming activities in the
state").
127. Id. (striking section 20.165(2)(f), Florida Statutes) and S.B. 710cl, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2012)(striking section 120.80(4)(a), Florida Statutes).
128. Id. (proposing section 551.304(f), Florida Statutes, authorizing the State Gaming
Commission to license pari-mutuel gaming facilities); see S.B. 710c1, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2012)(transferring power from Department of Business and Professional Regulation to the
Department of Gaming Control by replacing section 120.80(4)(a), Florida Statutes with section
120.80(19)).
129. S.B. 710cl, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012)(proposing section 551.003, Florida Statutes).
130. Id. (proposing section 551.003(2), Florida Statutes).
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ment.'1' The Governor appoints all seven members, subject to the con-
sent of the Senate.132 The Governor's appointment power is subject to
the limitations imposed by a six-member State Gaming Commission
Nominating Committee.1 33 Each member earns an annual salary of
$125,000, except for the Chair, who earns $135,000.13 The Department
unilaterally adopts the rules and procedure for license holders operating
gaming facilities in Florida, enforces those rules and procedures,' 3 5 and
suspends any permit or license when the holder has violated any provi-
sion of Florida law or the rules adopted by the Department."3 6
The Governor also designates the Chair, while the Commission
elects the Vice Chair.' 3 The Commission appoints and removes the
executive director and general counsel of the Department.' The Chair
decides all questions of order and assigns duties to each member.'13 On
a day-to-day basis, however, the Executive Director serves as the agency
head of the Department.14 0 The Executive Director is a full-time
employee appointed to carry out the duties assigned by the Commission
and hire all assistants and employees necessary to conduct the business
of the Commission. 14 1
The Department may train and employ sworn law enforcement
officers to enforce any criminal law, conduct any criminal investigation,
or enforce any statute within the Department's jurisdiction.142 These
officers are vested with arrest authority and the right to carry arms.14 3
According to the Department's self-imposed Code of Ethics,'" the
Executive Director, Commissioners, and all Department employees and
agents are prohibited from gaining any employment or commercial
interest in any license applicant or holder for three years following ser-
vice in the Department. 1 5 Former Department employees are also pro-
hibited from representing any license applicant or holder before the
Commission, which may be extremely inconvenient for any professional
131. Id. (proposing section 20.318(1), Florida Statutes).
132. Id. (proposing section 551.003(2)(b)(4)(c), Florida Statutes).
133. Id. (proposing section 551.004, Florida Statutes).
134. S.B. 710c1, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012)(proposing section 551.006, Florida Statutes).
135. Id. (proposing section 20.318(4)(k), Florida Statutes).
136. Id. (proposing section 20.318(4)(a), (e), Florida Statutes).
137. Id. (proposing section 551.003(3)(a), Florida Statutes).
138. Id. (proposing section 20.318(1), Florida Statutes, and section 551.006, Florida Statutes).
139. S.B. 710cl, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012)(proposing section 551.003(3)(a), Florida
Statutes).
140. Id. (proposing section 551.003(7), Florida Statutes).
141. Id. (proposing section 551.006, Florida Statutes).
142. Id. (proposing section 551.007(1), Florida Statutes).
143. Id. (proposing section 551.007(1)(b), (c), Florida Statutes).
144. S.B. 710cl, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012)(proposing section 551.008(1), Florida Statutes).
145. Id. (proposing section 551.008(2), (3), Florida Statutes).
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looking to transfer from public to private practice within the industry. 14 6
The death knell, however, is that the prohibition also extends to the
entire business entity that employs a former Commissioner, Executive
Director, or Department employee.' 47 For example, a former Depart-
ment employee cannot seek employment at a law firm's Orlando office
if that same law firm's Miami office employs attorneys who represent a
license holder. The strict codes of ethics imposed on the Department
also include extensive disclosure filings,14 8 procedures for dealing with
ex parte communications,1 49 and severe penalties for noncompliance.'
c. The Destination Resort Act
Amended Senate Bill 710 would enact the Destination Resort
Act,'"' which gives the Commission three critical decisions to make;
that is, to whom to grant three Florida gaming licenses.152 At first
glance, it would appear that Florida is establishing a gaming regime sim-
ilar to the New Jersey model: limiting gaming to a particular jurisdic-
tion. However, casino magnates are contemplating building resorts in
heavily populated and thriving South Florida metropolises. Unlike South
Florida, at the time casino gaming was legalized in New Jersey, Atlantic
City was in a deplorable state of disrepair and in desperate need of revi-
talization.'5 3 New Jersey lawmakers envisioned the construction of mul-
tiple casinos ushering a new age of New Jersey tourism. By comparison,
Florida lawmakers do not need resort-casinos to fill a void in South
Florida's tourist industry; it is already thriving.15 Florida lawmakers
simply recognize an opportunity to enhance tourism in South Florida.
The introduction of resort-casino presents the serious threat of disman-
146. Id. (proposing section 551.008(4), Florida Statutes).
147. Id. (proposing section 551.008(5), Florida Statutes) (defining "business entity" as a
corporation, limited liability company, partnership, limited liability partnership association, trust,
or "other form of legal entity").
148. Id. (proposing section 551.009(1), Florida Statutes) (commissioners must file a financial
disclosure statement pursuant to Fla. Stat. 112.3145 which requires disclosure of all sources of
gross income exceeding $2,500 or 5 percent of gross income received during a specified
disclosure period, locations or descriptions of real property exceeding $10,000, and all liabilities
in excess of $10,000, among other information).
149. S.B. 710cl, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012) (proposing section 551.011(1), (2), Florida
Statutes).
150. Id. (proposing section 551.012, Florida Statutes).
151. Id. (proposing section 551.301, et seq., Florida Statutes).
152. Id. (proposing section 551.304(1)(a), Florida Statutes); see also S.B. 710cl, 2012 Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2012) (proposing section 551.307, Florida Statutes).
153. STERNLIEB & HUGHEs, supra note 26, 9-14.
154. See e.g., Douglas Hanks, Casinos want to boost Miami tourism, but does it need the
help?, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 12, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/04/
2587296/casinos-want-to-boost-miami-tourism.html.
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tling Florida's most prized attractions and events.' 5 The Florida legisla-
ture, therefore, should cede more regulatory power to the local
governmental bodies to provide additional perspective on how to protect
and preserve burgeoning South Florida communities.
Under the bill, the Commission is charged with the task of investi-
gating each prospective licensee and selecting the licensee that best
serves the interests of the residents of Florida with respect to economic
development, infrastructure investment, and revenue generation.' 6 To
begin an application, the Commission must invite applicants to begin the
negotiation process "based on minimum requirements established by ...
the department."15 7 Any prospective licensee should carefully navigate
the "minimum requirements" set by the Department to ensure that nego-
tiations and communications between members and applicants do not
violate the code of ethics.
Each applicant would submit a nonrefundable $1 million applica-
tion fee to cover the administrative costs associated with the extensive
background investigation.1 58 For example, the Department would inter-
rogate corporate officers as well as audit books and records to verify an
applicant's assets, financial backing, investors, and indebtedness.' The
bill also calls upon the Department of Law Enforcement to perform
background checks and investigate suspected criminal activity.160 For
example, international and United States law enforcement officials iden-
tified a former Genting partner, Stanley Ho Hung-Sun, as a money laun-
derer in 2007, which stalled Genting developments in Singapore and
New York until the company cut ties with Ho.16 ' As a result, state and
local law enforcement agencies are granted unrestricted access to gam-
ing facilities to conduct criminal investigations, inspections, and monitor
compliance. 6 2 However, local governing authorities have little to no
role in this process.
155. See e.g., Douglas Hanks, Art Basel signs on through 2015, despite casino worries, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 6, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/12/06/2534295/art-basel-
signs-on-through-2015.html.
156. Id. (proposing section 551.304(1)(b), (d), (e) Florida Statutes).
157. S.B. 710c1, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012)(proposing section 551.304(l)(c), Florida
Statutes).
158. Id. (proposing section 551.310(4)(a), Florida Statutes).
159. Id. (proposing section 551.304(1)(g)-(i), Florida Statutes).
160. Id. (proposing section 551.304(3), (5), Florida Statutes).
161. Francisco Alvarado, Three Miami mayors block Genting casino, Sep. 29, 2011, THE
MIAMI NEW TIMES, NEWS BLOG, available at http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2011-09-29/news/
three-miami-mayors-block-genting-casino/.
162. S.B. 710cl, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012)(proposing section 551.304(2), (3), Florida
Statutes).
2012] 1203
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
d. Centralization of Power under the Destination Resort Act
The Department is given broad discretion to develop the rules and
procedures to administer and regulate gaming. 163 For example, the
Department would unilaterally impose time, place, and structure restric-
tions on gaming operations, authorize the types of gaming activities per-
mitted, and craft the rules governing those games. 164 Additionally, the
Department would unilaterally craft the procedures and qualifications
regarding the issuance and revocation of licenses, inspections, account-
ing of gaming revenues, collecting taxes and fees, as well as more inva-
sive regulations like minimum employee training standards, size and
color requirements for gaming chips, and "any other rules the depart-
ment finds necessary."1 65 Although the Department is vested with signif-
icantly broad powers, these regulatory powers do not significantly vary
from those extended to the Nevada or New Jersey regulatory agencies.
However, the Florida gaming bill grants the Department additional
powers and authority that should, at a minimum, demand serious con-
templation before enacting a bill with identical provisions into law.
Reminiscent of New Jersey Governor Corzine's 2007 shutdown pow-
ers,166 the Department is authorized to adopt emergency rules "at any
time" to preserve the rights and welfare of the people in order to provide
additional funds to benefit the public. 167 In the interest of taking swift
action, unelected Department agents need not make any required find-
ings before "respond [ing]" as quickly as [ ] practicable" to any emer-
gency issue. 168 Depending on the degree of "emergency" action taken by
these agents, the Department could seriously endanger the vitality of
gaming industry and subject the Florida Department of Treasury to com-
pensate stiff damages.
In addition, the bill makes it explicitly clear that the State of Florida
has the unilateral authority to enact rules and laws related to gaming: "a
county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state may not
enact any ordinance relating to limited gaming."1 69 Rather, "[o]nly the
[D]epartment . . . may administer this part and regulate limited gam-
ing." 7 0 Therefore, the cities and counties hosting licensees, who are
arguably most significantly affected by gaming, do not have a meaning-
ful opportunity to contribute to the regulation of casino-resorts.
163. Id. (proposing section 551.305(1), Florida Statutes).
164. Id. (proposing section 551.305(1)(a), Florida Statutes).
165. Id. (proposing section 551.305(1)(f), (g), Florida Statutes).
166. See Cooper, supra note 98, at 210.
167. S.B. 710cl, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012)(proposing section 551.305(2), Florida Statutes).
168. Id. (proposing section 551.305(2), Florida Statutes).
169. Id. (proposing section 551.306, Florida Statutes).
170. Id. (proposing section 551.306, Florida Statutes).
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Amended Senate Bill 710 provides local populations with one piv-
otal opportunity to have its voice heard: a countywide referendum.'
The Commission may only award a license to an applicant if a majority
of the county electorate at the proposed location votes in favor of
allowing gaming.17 2 In addition, ten percent of the application contem-
plates the likelihood that the licensee will enhance the local community
through partnership programs, increased employment, and public ser-
vice.' In addition, the Commission may specify the particular county
where the facility would be located, and accordingly, hold public hear-
ings to discuss proposals and receive public comments during the appli-
cation phase of licensing.174 Regardless, the bill makes no mention of
whether the Commissioner should heed any comments.
e. Need for Delegating More Power to Local Government Bodies
Ultimately, Amended Senate Bill 170 does not grant local govern-
ments sufficient powers to protect the interests of local residents. Subse-
quent Florida gaming bills should empower local populations and better
serve the interests of Florida residents and casino-resort licensees by
enacting legislation that would bring these parties face-to-face. Follow-
ing Nevada's lead,'7 Florida should require prospective licensees to
stand before municipal and county boards and engage community lead-
ers on the issues that matter. Local residents want to have a say in the
construction and development of a $2 billion destination resort built in
their own backyard.176 Sharon Wynne, who lives within a mile of the
proposed Genting site said, "We can't have this giant complex right
here. It is too big. It will overwhelm the neighborhood and it will depre-
ciate our property values." 7 7
The Genting Group took the initiative itself to schedule meetings
with local residents, businesspeople, and civic leaders in an effort to
fine-tune its plan.'17  Under the Amended Senate Bill 170, local
residents, businesspeople, and civic leaders can only hope that other
applicants take the time to address local concerns and follow through on
addressing those issues. As mentioned, Nevada's regulatory model
required applicants to seek licenses at the state, county and municipal
171. S.B. 710cl, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012) (proposing section 551.307, Florida Statutes).
172. Id. (Fla. 2012)(proposing section 551.307, Florida Statutes).
173. Id. (proposing section 551.309(2)(a)(4), Florida Statutes).
174. S.B. 710c1, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012) (enacting section 551.308(2), Florida Statutes).
175. See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.3086.
176. Paola luspa-Abbott, Genting's Lobbying Power Worries Residents, Activists: Traffic,
parking chief among the concerns, Jan. 12, 2012, DAILY BUSINEsS REVIEW, at A7.
177. Id.
178. Id. at A10.
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level.17 9 Empowering municipal boards brings applicants face-to-face
with local communities and forges bonds of familiarity from one party
to another, which is conducive toward satisfying Nevada's public policy
goal: building public trust and confidence in the gaming industry."so The
Florida legislature should reconsider the extent to which it limits munic-
ipal government's voice in the new era of Florida gaming.
However, with good reason, the legislature may wary of delegating
too much discretionary power to local government officials. In Decem-
ber 2011, the Securities & Exchange Commission opened an investiga-
tion into the newly constructed Miami Marlins' ballpark that left the
county and city responsible for almost 80 percent of the $634 million
bottom line."" Furthermore, almost a year after Miami-Dade County
and City officials promised transit improvements to facilitate traffic to
the new stadium, city and county officials have failed to ensure that
Marlins officials to follow through on funding any of those commit-
ments. 182 Kenneth Goodman, the co-director of the University of Miami
Ethics Program said, "The responsibility of government is to ensure
development proceeds according to a plan that serves the need of a com-
munity."' 8 3 Accordingly, Professor Goodman lamented that Miami and
South Florida have a storied history of failing to take action "to ensure
proper growth and development in our community."' 84 Professor Good-
man argued city and county officials should be equipped with sufficient
regulatory muscle to get developers to post bonds to fund the engineer-
ing projects that will address air quality issues, increased traffic, storm
water runoff, hurricane protection, sewage, crime control, and impact
fees."' "These are not reasons not to do this project," Professor Good-
man said, "We just have to make sure the bolts are in tight when we
build."' 6
Currently, the only leverage local officials have is site plan
179. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 463.180(1) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.190(1) (2011); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 463.230(1) (2011).
180. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0129(1)(b), (c) (2011); see also MORSE & Goss, supra note
40, at 100.
181. Charles Rabin et al., Feds open SEC probe into Miami Marlins stadium deal, THE MiAMi
HERALD, Dec. 3, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/12/02/2529191/feds-open-
sec-probe-into-miami.html.
182. Charles Rabin & Andres Viglucci, Transit plans stalled to ease traffic flow to new Miami
Marlins ballpark, THE MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 15, 2012, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/
2012/01/15/2591407/transit-plans-stalled-to-ease.html.
183. Paola Iuspa-Abbott, Genting's Lobbying Power Worries Residents, Activists: Traffic,
parking chief among the concerns, Jan. 12, 2012, DAILY BUSINESS REVIEw, at Al0.
184. Telephone Interview, Kenneth Goodman, Professor, University of Miami Ethics Program,
Jan. 16, 2012.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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approval.' The city and county will be jointly responsible for approv-
ing a development agreement with Genting and the project's site plan,
which has to comply with traffic, environmental, and infrastructure
requirements for the area.'"
f. Developing a Sound Policy Goal
Learning from New Jersey's experience with appropriating gaming
tax revenues, subsequent Florida gaming bills should specify how the
Florida legislature should appropriate gaming tax revenues to stimulate
the state economy and develop local markets. On top of an annual $5
million licensing fee, 18 9 each licensee must pay a ten percent tax on
gross revenues' 90 and $125 initial licensing fee.'91 The Commission
must deposit 97 percent of those taxes in the state's General Revenue
Fund. 19 2 By conservative estimates, Florida will generate $100 million
in state taxes from the casino-resorts annually. 93 The Florida gaming
bill co-sponsor, Representative Fresen, claimed that the gaming bill is
not about generating tax revenues; rather, the bill aims to spur economic
development and job creation.1' Regardless, Florida will have a hefty
chunk of change on its hands from these casinos. Keeping in mind the
legislator's intent, appropriation of gaming tax revenues should aim to
spur economic development and job creation across the state. Accord-
ingly, the legislature should invest gaming tax revenues in public
infrastructure.
In counties like Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach, income
inequality ranks among the highest in the nation.19 Gaming tax reve-
nues can narrow that gap by spurring economic development and job
growth. Ultimately, the legislature can induce municipal governments to
agree to permit low-cost housing, public transportation, and road
improvements by funding those improvements entirely from gaming tax
187. See luspa-Abbott, supra note 183.
188. Id. at A7.
189. S.B. 710cl, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012)(proposing section 551.318(l), Florida Statutes).
190. Id. (proposing section 551.318(2)(a), Florida Statutes).
191. Id. (proposing section 551.310(4)(b), Florida Statutes).
192. Id. (proposing section 551.318(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes).
193. Douglas Hanks, Florida's proposed 10% casino tax called jackpot for industry, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 19, 2011, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/11/19/2509891/floridas-
proposed- I 0-casino-tax.html.
194. Douglas Hanks, Florida's proposed 10% casino tax called jackpot for industry, MIAMI
HERALD, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/11/19/2509891/floridas-proposed-10-
casino-tax.html.
195. Donna Gehrke-White, Wealth gap in South Florida second-widest in US, THE SUN-
SENTINEL, Oct. 28, 2011, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-10-28/business/fl-
income-inequality-20111028_1_wealth-gap-income-disparity-south-florida.
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revenues.19 6
Unlike municipal governments in New Jersey, the metropolitan
government that consolidates the Miami-Dade County and City of
Miami governments presents the rare occasion where city and county
governments maintain tax-sharing agreements "designed to reduce the
fiscal inequities that flow from uneven patterns of growth and public
investment in metropolitan areas."' 9 In anticipation of elevated munici-
pal property taxes, Miami-Dade County Mayor Carlos Gimenez
explained that City officials would "be able to pave the streets in that
area in gold."' 9 Consequently, Miami-Dade County officials imple-
mented the proper mechanisms to appropriate a larger share of city taxes
in October 2011.199 Representative Fresen estimated that municipal and
county governments would likely reap another $100 million based on
the assessment of real property taxes. Thus, the careful expenditure of
gaming tax revenues will present South Florida with the opportunity to
level the playing field for its citizenry by catalyzing economic develop-
ment and stimulating job growth.
V. CONCLUSION: AN HISTORICAL OBSERVATION
For the most part, sound regulatory policy tends to focus upon the
goal of developing public confidence in gaming as a legitimate form of
entertainment. 200 Regulations need to address consumer concerns about
fraudulent, unfair, or otherwise dangerous practices that potentially
affect patrons, disassociate criminal elements from state-sanctioned
gambling establishments, and protect patrons from unscrupulous gaming
operators and threats of violence due to losses. 201' Amended Senate Bill
710 grants sufficient powers to the Department of Gaming Control to
monitor, regulate, and legitimize the future Florida gaming industry.
The main unresolved issue is whether the lack of power and author-
ity delegated to local government bodies is wise. However, history has
shown that limiting local regulatory power has produced picture perfect
results for Florida.
The Walt Disney World Resort Complex first opened to the public
196. Cashin, supra note 103, 2028-32.
197. Id.
198. Charles Rabin & Martha Branniga, Miami-Dade to Miami: Give us a share of city's
casino windfall, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 4, 2011, available at http://www.miamiheraid.com/201 1/10/
04/2438895/miami-dade-to-miami-give-us-a.html.
199. Id.
200. MORSE & Goss, supra note 40, at 97-98.
201. Id. at 97-99.
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on October 1, 1971.202 Within ten years, Disney World attracted an esti-
mated $4 billion from tourists alone, 2 03 and by 1997, the total value of
the Walt Disney Company skyrocketed to $50 billion. 2 1 Before Disney
World came to town, central Florida was an agricultural wilderness full
of cattle ranches, citrus groves, and wild animals.20 5 It was prone to
economic boom-and-bust-cycles; for example, the occasional citrus
freeze devastated the local economy and constricted the growth of the
agricultural industry.20 6
In 1993, a master's in planning student at University of Tennessee
claimed that Disney "tested the authority of government."20 7 Disney
executives made a final strategic push in February 1967 before Governor
Claude Kirk, his cabinet, the state legislature, business leaders, and
media and laid out plans for an amusement park, motels, sports and rec-
reational areas and promises to take advantage and preserve the natural
beauty of the area 20 8 Although Walt Disney died in December 1966
from lung cancer, he pitched EPCOT from the grave by video, making a
strong impression on his audience with his conviction and sincerity: 20 9
We must have flexibility . . . to work in cooperation with American
industry, and to make decisions based on standards of performance. If
we have this kind of freedom, I'm confident we can create a world
showcase for American free enterprise that will bring new industry to
the state of Florida from all over the country.210
In May 1967, Governor Kirk signed the bill that established Reedy
Creek Improvement District, which gave Disney the authority govern
itself.211 Under the Reedy Creek Improvement District, Walt Disney
World Resort was able to go over the heads of Osceola and Orange
County local governments, to zone, develop, tax and administer itself. It
had the authority to levy taxes to pay for utilities, roads, and infrastruc-
ture, issue bonds, make zoning decisions, and have a strict set of build-
ing codes. Disney hired Army chief engineer and former Panama Canal
Zone governor Major General William to lead the team of engineers
202. REEDY CREEK IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, http://www.rcid.org/AboutUS-main.cfm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2012).
203. EVE ZIBART, THE UNOFFICIAL DISNEY COMPANION: THE INSIDE STORY OF WALT DISNEY
WORLD AND THE MAN BEHIND THE MOUSE, 29 (1st ed. 1997).
204. Id. at 2.
205. Id. at 21-22.
206. See FLORIDA CITRUS MUTUAL available at http://flcitrusmutual.com/industry-issues/
weather/freeze-timeline.aspx (last visited (Jan 28, 2012)
207. See ZIBART, supra note 203, at 11.
208. Id. at 27.
209. Id. at 28.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 29.
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whose work rivaled the ingenuity of the Dutch. Disney engineers insti-
tuted an innovative system of water reclamation to prevent excessive
flooding and drainage characteristic of the central Florida wetlands;
carefully planned for public transportation, including by rail; and
installed a compacting trash collection system that uses pneumatic tubes.
Disney has been an undeniable economic boom to Orlando, turning the
entire region into a prime investment market and one of the top tourist
destinations; its property taxes add millions to local budgets annually,
and each time a new park is built, thousands of construction and perma-
nent jobs are added.212
Albeit on a smaller scale, casino-resorts in Florida have a similar
potential to that of Disney World. The success of Disney World is owed
to its careful, precise, and thoughtful planning. However, careful, pre-
cise, and thoughtful planning is owed to sophisticated judgment and
extensive power exercised at the local level of government.
Florida casino-resorts have incredible potential to uplift Florida and
local communities alike. However, the Florida legislature must first
empower local government bodies with sufficient regulatory powers to
ensure responsible growth. In addition, the Florida legislature should
develop a detailed plan for reinvesting gaming tax revenues in public
infrastructure investments.
As one hotel manager in central Florida once said, "This is a capi-
talistic society. I look at it this way: If Disney wasn't here, we'd all be
sitting in orange groves."' South Floridians may not be sitting in
orange groves at the moment, but if organized and regulated responsibly,
South Floridians will have an opportunity to uplift themselves, their
family, and their communities.
212. Id. at 24-31.
213. See ZIBART, supra note 203, 32.
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